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Self deception is a fascinating phenomenon and has been used by philosophers aplenty to examine the consistency of selfhood and the nature of consciousness. Sartre used the phrase 'bad faith' to describe a mental state humans often compel themselves towards. Existential reasoning lead him into the seeming infinite loops which arise in our consciousness. Consciousness denies freedom which denies itself, blind selfhood rolls off into infinity. From Wikipedia:We all lie, all the time. It causes problems, to say the least. So why do we do it?
It boils down to the shifting sands of the self and trying to look good both to ourselves and others, experts say.
"It's tied in with self-esteem," says University of Massachusetts psychologist Robert Feldman. "We find that as soon as people feel that their self-esteem is threatened, they immediately begin to lie at higher levels."
Many animals engage in deception, or deliberately misleading another, but only humans are wired to deceive both themselves and others, researchers say. People are so engaged in managing how others perceive them that they are often unable to separate truth from fiction in their own minds, Feldman's research shows.
[...]
"People almost lie reflexively," Feldman says. "They don't think about it as part of their normal social discourse." But it is, the research showed.
"We're trying not so much to impress other people but to maintain a view of ourselves that is consistent with the way they would like us to be," Feldman said. We want to be agreeable, to make the social situation smoother or easier, and to avoid insulting others through disagreement or discord.
Men lie no more than women, but they tend to lie to make themselves look better, while women are more likely to lie to make the other person feel better.
Extroverts tend to lie more than introverts, Feldman found in similar research involving a job-interview situation.
- Link to 'Why We lie'
Bad faithIs this evidence that the lie is where we find reality? Without it, it seems, a consistent self could not be maintained. Animals appear to deceive, but in the ability of humans to deceive their own self perhaps we see glimpses of our inate power. In denying our objective world the human is naturally thrust into a state of inner reality, a solipsism reliant on the depth of lie one envelopes oneself in. Where do the human, the lie and the real interlink? Is all a lie?A critical claim in existentialist thought is that we are always radically free to make choices and guide our lives towards our own chosen goal (or 'project'). We cannot escape this freedom, even in overwhelming circumstances. For instance, even a armed mugger's victim possesses choices: to hand over his wallet; to negotiate; to beg; to run; to counter-attack; or to die.
Although we are limited by our circumstances (our facticity), these cannot force us, as radically free beings, to follow one course over another. For this reason, we choose in anguish: we know that we must make a choice, that it will have consequences, and that some choices are better than others. But for Sartre, to claim that one amongst our many conscious possiblities takes undeniable precedence (for instance, 'I cannot risk my life, because I must support my family') is to assume the role of an object in the world, merely at the mercy of circumstance - a being-in-itself that is only its own facticity.
Intentional Consciousness and Freedom
For Sartre this attitude is manifestly self-decieving. As human consciousness, we are always aware that we are not whatever we are aware of - we cannot, in this sense, be defined as our 'intentional objects' of consciousness, including our facticity of personal history, character, bodies, or objective responsibility. Thus, as Sartre often repeated, 'human reality is what it is not, and it is not what it is': it can only define itself negatively, as 'what it is not'; but this negation is simultaneously the only positive definition it can make of 'what it is'.
From this we are aware of a host of alternative reactions to our objective situation - i.e., of freedom - since no situation can dictate a single response. Only in assuming social roles and value systems external to this nature as conscious beings can we pretend that these possiblities are denied to us; but this is itself a decision made possible by our freedom and our separation from these things. It is this paradoxical free decision to deny to ourselves this inescapable freedom which is 'bad faith'.
- Link to Sartre and Bad Faith
...self-deception evolves in the service of deceit. I think that self-deception not only hides your deceit better from others but also allows you to practise deception in a less cognitively expensive way. If you're aware of the truth and the untruth simultaneously, and you're trying to project the untruth, that's cognitively expensive. But if you make at least part of deception unconscious, then it's less demanding. I want to organise the whole field of self-deception coherently. When we pray, are we practising self-deception? When we have positive illusions that are partly self-fulfilling, is that the same kind of thing as when we suppress information the better to fool others? What kind of deceit and self-deception do you expect in your relations with your parents? What kind do you expect in relations between the sexes? What differences do you expect between males and females?Interesting too was your comment on the origin of storytelling. I like John Gray's (author of Straw Dogs) idea that writing acts as a false memory which reflect the mutually constructed lies of human culture into a coherent, but plainly illusionary, version of our history. Fiction is all their ever can be, yet we still deceive ourselves that some things are more fictional than others.
If the constructed reality and negation of truth are the only ways in which we can define ourselves, then the question of "why do we lie?" might be better stated "why do lies matter?" With what learned/biological faculties have we as individuals, cultures, countries, etc. come to regard lies in such different lights? Why is the lie wrong if we are unable to trully define it, and why are we taught that lies are wrong in the first place?Amen! And if lies are bad, how can tattling be bad? Malcom Gladwell explores just that question in his review for the New Yorker of Why?, by Charles Tilly.
. . .Gladwell goes on to explain the "four general categories of reasons" put forth in the book.
Timothy has heard that phrase—“Don’t be a tattletale”—countless times, and it always stops him short. He has offered his mother an eyewitness account of a crime. His mother, furthermore, in no way disputes the truth of his story. Yet what does she do? She rejects it in favor of a simplistic social formula: Don’t be a tattletale. It makes no sense.
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. . .This is not a hierarchy of reasons: each, according to Tilly, has its various roles. Conflict arrises when we disagree which form of reason appropriately describes a situation (when we're "talking past each other"). Gladwell uses the abortion debate as an example:
In Tilly’s view, we rely on four general categories of reasons. The first is what he calls conventions—conventionally accepted explanations. Tilly would call “Don’t be a tattletale” a convention. The second is stories, and what distinguishes a story (“I was playing with my truck, and then Geoffrey came in . . .”) is a very specific account of cause and effect. . . [Stories] circumscribe time and space, limit the number of actors and actions, situate all causes “in the consciousness of the actors,” and elevate the personal over the institutional.
Then there are codes, which are high-level conventions, formulas that invoke sometimes recondite procedural rules and categories. If a loan officer turns you down for a mortgage, the reason he gives has to do with your inability to conform to a prescribed standard of creditworthiness. Finally, there are technical accounts: stories informed by specialized knowledge and authority. An academic history of civil-rights sit-ins wouldn’t leave out the role of institutions, and it probably wouldn’t focus on a few actors and actions; it would aim at giving patient and expert attention to every sort of nuance and detail.
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. . . If you believe that stories are the most appropriate form of reason-giving, then those who use conventions and technical accounts will seem morally indifferent—regardless of whether you agree with them. And, if you believe that a problem is best adjudicated through conventions or technical accounts, it is hard not to look upon storytellers as sensationalistic and intellectually unserious.It's a great review, and I plan on buying the book.
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